"Yes to moral fictionalism; no to religious fictionalism," in R. Joyce & S. Brock (eds.), Moral Fictionalism and Religious Fictionalism (Oxford University Press, 2023) 256-276.

“Error theory,” International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell, 2024).

“Nihilism,” International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd edition (Wiley-Blackwell, 2023).

“Moral anti-realism,” entry for Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021). (Earlier versions: 2007 & 2015.)

"Fictionalism: Morality and metaphor," in B. Armour-Garb & F. Kroon (eds.), Fictionalism in Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2020): 103-121.

"Review of Michael Tomasello's A Natural History of Human Morality," Utilitas 31 (2019): 207-211.

"Moral and epistemic normativity: The guilty and the innocent," in C. Cowie & R. Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics (Routledge, 2019): 53-72.

"The denial of moral knowledge," in M. Timmons, K. Jones, & A. Zimmerman (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Moral Epistemology (Routledge, 2019): 289-303.

“Moral skepticism and the ‘What next?’ question.” Introduction to  R. Garner & R. Joyce (eds.), The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously (Routledge, 2019): x-xxiii.

"Moral fictionalism: How to have your cake and eat it too," in R. Garner & R. Joyce (eds.), The End of Morality: Taking Moral Abolitionism Seriously (Routledge, 2019): 150-165.

"Arguments from moral disagreement to moral skepticism," in D. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism (Routledge, 2018): 141-162.

"Moral skepticism," in D. Machuca & B. Reed (eds.), Skepticism: Antiquity to the Present (Bloomsbury, 2018): 714-726.

"Fictionalism in metaethics," in D. Plunkett & T. McPherson (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics (Routledge, 2017): 72-86.

"Human morality: From an empirical puzzle to a metaethical puzzle," in M. Ruse & R. Richards (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Evolutionary Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2017): 101-113.

"Morality: The evolution of a myth." Introduction to R. Joyce, Essays in Moral Skepticism (Oxford University Press, 2016).

"Reply to 'On the validity of a simple argument for moral error theory,'" International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (2016): 518-522.

"Reply: Confessions of a modest debunker," in U. Leibowitz & N. Sinclair (eds.), Explanation in Mathematics and Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2016): 124-145.

“Evolution and moral naturalism,” in K. Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism (2016): 369-385.

“Evolution, truth-tracking, and moral skepticism,” in R. Joyce, Essays in Moral Skepticism (Oxford University Press, 2016): 142-158.

“Review of Kaebnick & Murray (eds.), Synthetic Biology and Morality: Artificial Life and the Bounds of Nature,” Quarterly Review of Biology 89 (2014).

"Normality and normativity." Poster presented at the 12th World Congress of Bioethics (Mexico City, 2014). [huge pdf format]

"Review of Kieran Setiya's Knowing Right from Wrong," The International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (2014).

"Taking moral skepticism seriously: Symposium contribution on David Enoch's Taking Morality Seriously," Philosophical Studies 168 (2014): 843-851 .

“Profiles in evolutionary moral psychology: Richard Joyce.” Interview for Evolution: This View of Life (2014).

"The origins of moral judgment," Behaviour 151 (2014): 261-278.
[Reprinted in F. de Waal et al. (eds.), Evolved Morality: The Biology and Philosophy of Human Conscience (Brill, 2014): 125-142.]

"Irrealism and the genealogy of morals," Ratio 26 (2013): 351-372.
[Reprinted in B. Streumer (ed.), Irrealism in Ethics (Wiley Blackwell, 2014): 1-22.]

"Psychological fictionalism, and the threat of fictionalist suicide," Monist 96 (2013): 517-538.

"Review of Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu's Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement," Analysis 73 (2013).

“Ethics and evolution,” in H. LaFollette & I. Persson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, 2nd edition (Blackwell, 2013): 123-147.

“Altruism and biology,” International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell: 2013).

“The evolutionary debunking of morality,” in J. Feinberg & R. Shafer-Landau (eds.), Reason and Responsibility, 15th edition (Cengage, 2013): 527-534.

“The many moral nativisms,” in K. Sterelny, R. Joyce, B. Calcott, & B. Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution (MIT Press, 2013): 549-572.

"Review of David Enoch's Taking Morality Seriously," Ethics 123 (2013).

“Ethics after Darwin,” Cambridge Encyclopedia of Darwin and Evolutionary Thought, M. Ruse (ed.), (Cambridge University Press: 2013): 461-467.

“Enough with the errors! A final reply to Finlay,” unpublished (2012).

“Metaethical pluralism: How both moral naturalism and moral skepticism may be permissible positions,” in S. Nuccetelli and G. Seay (eds.), Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates (Cambridge University Press, 2012): 89-109.

“The error in ‘The error in the error theory’,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2011): 519-534.

“The accidental error theorist,” in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 6 (Oxford University Press, 2011): 153-180.

“Review essay: Mark Kalderon’s Moral Fictionalism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2011): 161-173.

“Moral fictionalism: When falsehoods are too useful to throw out.” Philosophy Now 82 (2011).

“Expressivism, motivation internalism, and Hume,” in C. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue (Palgrave MacMillan, 2010): 30-56.

“Review of Frans de Waal’s Primates and Philosophers,” Quarterly Review of Biology 85 (2010).

“Patterns of objectification,” in R. Joyce & S. Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory (Springer Press, 2010): 35-53.

“Introduction” (co-written with Simon Kirchin) to R. Joyce & S. Kirchin (eds.), A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Moral Error Theory (Springer Press, 2010): ix-xxiv.

“Is moral projectivism empirically tractable?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (2009): 53-75.

“Moral relativists gone wild: Review of Jesse Prinz’s The Emotional Construction of Morals," Mind 118 (2009).

“The Skeptick’s Tale: Symposium contribution on Michael Huemer’s Ethical Intuitionism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2009).

Symposium on The Evolution of Morality: precis and reply to critics (Stephen Stich, Jesse Prinz, Peter Carruthers & Scott James), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2008): 213-267.

“What neuroscience can (and cannot) contribute to metaethics,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology Volume 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development (MIT Press, 2008): 371-394.

“Response to Nichols and Katz,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology Volume 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development (MIT Press, 2008): 419-426.

“Aversions, sentiments, moral judgments, and taboos,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Volume 1: The Evolution of Morality: Adaptations and Innateness (MIT Press, 2008): 195-204.

“Morality, schmorality,” in P. Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest (Oxford University Press, 2007): 51-75.

Introduction (co-written with Simon Kirchin) to Moral Skepticism: 30 Years of Inventing Right and Wrong. Special issue of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2007), marking the 30th anniversary of the publication of John Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong.

“Is human morality innate?” in P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, & S. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition (Oxford University Press: 2006): 257-279.
[Reprinted in M. Ruse (ed.) Philosophy after Darwin: Classic and Contemporary Readings (Princeton University Press, 2009): 452-463.]

“Metaethics and the empirical sciences,” Philosophical Explorations special issue 9 (2006): 133-148.

“Review of E. Milgram’s Ethics Done Right: Practical Reasoning as a Foundation for Moral Theory,” Philosophical Books 48 (2006).

“Review of Neil Levy’s What Makes Us Moral: Crossing the Boundaries of Biology,” Australian Journal of Professional and Applied Ethics 7 (2006).

“Moral fictionalism,” in M. Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2005): 287-313.

“Why humans judge things to be good: Review of Robert A. Hinde’s Why Good is Good,” Biology and Philosophy 19 (2004).

“Review of Gordon Graham’s Genes: A Philosophical Inquiry,” Philosophical Books 45 (2004).

“Cultural treasures and slippery slopes,” Public Affairs Quarterly 17 (2003): 1-16.

“Review of Paul Bloomfield's Moral Reality,” Mind 112 (2003).

“Expressivism and motivation internalism,” Analysis 62 (2002): 336-344.

“Theistic ethics and the Euthyphro dilemma,” Journal of Religious Ethics 30 (2002): 49-75.

“The moral value of moss: Review of Nicholas Agar’s Life’s Intrinsic Value,” Biology and Philosophy 17 (2002).

“Moral realism and teleosemantics,” Biology and Philosophy 16 (2001): 723-731.

“The fugitive thought,” Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (2000): 463-478.

“Darwinian ethics and error,” Biology and Philosophy 15 (2000): 713-732.
[Reprinted in N. Levy (ed.), Evolutionary Ethics (Ashgate, 2010).]

“Rational fear of monsters,” British Journal of Aesthetics 40 (2000): 209-224.

“Review of Rush Rhees’ Moral Questions,” Philosophical Books 41 (2000).

“Apologizing,” Public Affairs Quarterly 13 (1999): 159-173.

“Review of Mary Anne Warren’s Moral Status,” Philosophical Books 40 (1999).

“Cartesian memory,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (1997): 375-393.

“Early stoicism and akrasia,” Phronesis 40 (1995): 315-335.